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smaller actions necessarily means devoting less space to the critically important
ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter,
for while leaving something out invites
criticism that the book is incomplete,
limiting coverage of the critical turning
points invites criticism of another kind.
Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive,
and he covers a number of events that
are overlooked in most general histories
(including my own), such as the British
raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway
(Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and
the invasion of Madagascar (Operation
IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive
coverage of the Soviet navy in both the
Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes
with a cost, of course; running to six
hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is
not short, and yet it occasionally feels
crowded as events pile up on one
another—although no doubt that is how
the war felt to those who fought it as well.
Mawdsley is not afraid to make judgments. He argues, for example, that the
role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA)
has been greatly exaggerated and
that Hitler gave up on the invasion of
England (Operation SEA LION) before the
Battle of Britain even began. He defends
Churchill’s decision to attack the French
fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it
was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that
the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,”
for which Mountbatten “deserves
some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific,
Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and
Short were “rightly held responsible”
for being unready on 7 December
1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was
“surely right” not to approve a third aerial
attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).
It would be inappropriate for me to
recommend one of these books over
the other. Therefore I merely will
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suggest here that those interested
in the naval war from 1939 to 1945
should read (and buy) both of them.
CRAIG L. SYMONDS

Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer
for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P. Galvin. Carlisle,
PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018. 120
pages. Available for download at publications
.armywarcollege.edu/. Free.

As Charles D. Allen states in the foreword, “70 to 80 percent of organizational
change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous
reasons exist why initiatives to improve
an organization’s performance, effectiveness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect
problem diagnosis, poor planning or
resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture,
and resistance, among others. U.S.
Army War College professor Thomas
P. Galvin’s well-researched primer
effectively distills numerous organizational change philosophies and strategies
into a practical and intuitive guidebook
for military professionals at all levels.
A plethora of books on organizational
change exists, with an Amazon.com
search returning hundreds of results.
Professor Galvin tailors his approach to
the unique challenges of the military,
which prepares for an uncertain future
environment that before the crucible
of operations and combat can only be
simulated. He argues that most change
efforts are too process oriented, at the
expense of the often-overlooked context
of the environment and the content
of the change effort, which explain
its purpose and the path to success.
To this end, he develops a framework
similar to the military’s planning process
that emphasizes context and content,
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with sequences of questions to aid in
navigating all stages of change efforts.
Galvin argues that understanding the
context requires correctly diagnosing
the problem, gauging receptivity to
the proposed change, and determining
whether it even warrants expending
the resources. Although hierarchical,
military organizations are complex
adaptive systems, highlighting the
difficulty in tracing causal links and
often resulting in misdiagnosis. Factors
that gauge receptivity to the change
include internal and external environmental pressures; the level of trust and
empowerment within the organization;
and, for distributed organizations, the
fit between the change agenda and
local contexts. We live in an age of data
analytics, and often suffer from survey
fatigue. Therefore, taking the time to determine what data to collect for analysis
is essential and may flush out fundamental issues that need to be addressed
before implementation can proceed.
The most valuable section deals with
forecasting, which is the glue of the
content portion of the book. This links
the vision, plan, and communication
effort. While still an endeavor of
uncertainty, forecasting is differentiated from prediction in that it is more
quantifiable and probabilistic. Although
many tools exist within the Department
of Defense to paint this picture, making
a convincing case remains a challenge
from the strategic to the tactical level.
As General Martin Dempsey said in
an interview with Kelly Brownell for
the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter
podcast concerning the significant cuts
imposed by the 2011 Budget Control
Act, “When people ask me if I have
any regrets during my four years as
Chairman, one of them in particular is
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I really never managed to convince the
Congress of the United States that what
they were doing to the military budget
would have a detrimental effect over
time. . . . It’s hard to articulate words
like risk, they can be parsed and they
can be twisted or turned, or words like
readiness.” His salient point highlights
the difficulties leaders have in articulating future risk and promoting change.
Professor Galvin recommends
constructing dual narratives of future
undesired and desired end states, with
the former describing a status quo that
risks mission failure and the latter a
version in which competitive advantage
is restored. His principles of preparedness consist of a series of questions to
spark development of these competing
stories and include tangible and
abstract performance metrics. While
vivid imagery, framing, and marketing
can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly
asserts that credibility demands rigor.
Narratives must limit negations, refrain
from sounding unduly alarmist, and
avoid one’s being perceived as simply
a cheerleader. Once all elements are
established, the concept should be
expressed as a cognitive journey in
practical and actionable terms, with
obstacles and barriers presented as challenges that can and must be overcome.
Galvin’s primer is filled with invaluable
insights, frameworks, and anecdotes.
He provides examples of failed changes,
including General Eric K. Shinseki’s
decision to switch from standard
headgear to the black beret and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s
attempt to transition to the National
Security Personnel System. However,
selection of a case study, vignette, or
scenario applicable to any number of
situations and woven throughout the
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entire primer or as a separate annex
might have stitched the elements of
the book tighter together and made it
resonate more. Regardless, leaders at
all levels who want to increase their
chances of successfully implementing
and sustaining an organizational change
effort will benefit from making this an
essential addition to their tool kit.
KENNETH M. SANDLER

The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of
the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver
Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, by Anthony J.
Piscitelli. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017.
264 pages. $27.50.

Despite battlefield success in both Iraq
and Afghanistan over the past fifteen
years, the threat environment confronting the United States and its Marine
Corps only has grown more dangerous.
The United States now confronts a
variety of challenges both old and new,
including the return of great-power
conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe;
operating in (what until recently has
been called) an antiaccess/area-denial
(A2/AD) battle space; nuclear proliferation; and navigating the effects of global
climate change on military operations.
Such an environment calls for both refining old solutions and thinking in new,
bold ways to ensure that the U.S. military—and especially, for purposes of this
review, the Marine Corps—is ready to
meet, fight, and defeat any future threats.
Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his
years of State Department and academic
experience to map the evolution of the
Marine Corps’s approach to war in
the post–Vietnam War era, all the
while highlighting the personalities
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involved in that process. Piscitelli’s
work ultimately is most useful, though,
not for reviewing why the Marine
Corps adopted maneuver warfare but
for providing a model for instituting
structural changes at the service level
necessary for future battlefield success.
Following the Vietnam War, a combination of external and internal pressures led
the Marine Corps to institutionalize and
train to a war-fighting philosophy it had
practiced to varying degrees throughout
its history. The Marine Corps Way of
War details how the Marine Corps had
practiced elements of maneuver warfare
from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This
historical survey provides the context
for the interpersonal and bureaucratic
battles that Piscitelli then recounts that
led to the Corps’s full embrace of maneuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era.
Piscitelli then uses an excellent combination of first-person interviews and
after-action reports to summarize how
the Corps’s success in all the humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts,
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after
Vietnam resulted from the major internal
and external bureaucratic struggles over
the service’s future during that era. The
book’s emphasis on education and the
impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’
professional development also deserves
mention. Piscitelli’s decision to explore
how the adoption of maneuver warfare
also forced the Corps to rethink the
professional development of its enlisted
and officer populations underscores
how the human element of war remains
the most important variable in any
conflict. One should be forgiven for
thinking that parts of the book serve as
justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting.
Yet, despite providing an excellent
analysis that explores how the Corps
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